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INTRODUCTION
Incidents of severe environmental
destruction are not unique to this
century; they have a long historical
development. For example, sailors who
fell into the Thames in the late nineteenth
century did not drown, but rather
suffocated in the poisonous fumes of this
London sewer. In 1915, the German
"Reichsgericht" (Supreme Court)
recognized in "sick and dead fruit trees
... the typical character of an industrial
region to which the population had
resigned itself. 1
This deplorable state of affairs was the
consequence of a legal system that was
concerned primarily with the optimal
distribution of mineral resources and
commercial exploitation of the
environment, with no recognition of the
potential threat and creeping destruction.
An international ecological vacuum could
be found in this area of law well into the
1960s. This vacuum filled gradually
ending in a flood of new legislation in the
1980s. Even so, newly discovered
threats to the environment alarm both the
public and lawmakers worldwide.
Changes in climate, the greenhouse
effect, the hole in the ozone layer, acid
deposition, as well as increased mortality
rates caused by the emissions of modern
industries have all become part of a
scenario that demands basic decisions
and a reevaluation of traditional
principles.
Given these facts one suspects that
the legislative activities have been half-
hearted, uncoordinated and ineffective,
or at least have led to discrepancies
between the written law and its
implementation. Before making such a
determination, however, we must
consider several points:
1. The protection of the environment is
a societal issue affecting both how
we live today and the needs of future
generations. The crucial Issues are
(a) which hazards the state and
society are willing to accept, and (b)
who should have the authority to
decide this.
2. Insufficient knowledge regarding the
hazardous effects of activities,
despite the fact that many well-
organized and influential actors are
engaged in the process of deciding
which hazards are acceptable,
indicates that direct influence by legal
instruments is limited.
3. The regulation of environmental
destruction presents difficult
problems in criminal and tort law,
both of which are based upon
individual liability. The issue then
becomes what kinds of regulatory
changes will be necessary, and
possible, without infringing on
individual rights.
To address these issues this essay will
examine the regulatory methods used by
various countries. First, I shall give a
short overview of regulations in the
international sphere. Then I shall
elaborate on the national legal programs,
focusing on the criminal law sector.
THE INTERNATIONAL
PLATFORM
The number of international
agreements that target environmental
protection is impressive,2 suggesting
that world leaders recognize the fact that
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environmental destruction pays no regard
to national frontiers.3  Ecologically
effective measures require an
international consensus; although the
international community has made
important progress toward this goal,
consensus remains elusive. Moreover,
conventions often leave implementation
of the agreements to the discretion of the
individual states. Even if binding
regulations are enacted on the
supranational level, as in the European
Community ("EC"), national exceptions
are made quite frequently." Such
exceptions will probably remain the rule
for quite some time as the Eastern
European countries, with their terrible
environmental situation, associate with
the EC. As a result, one may expect that
interpretation and implementation of
international instruments will remain
inconsistent, at least for the time being.
The activities of the international
community can influence the traditional
values of economic expansion and
establish the conviction that expansion
into the Third World countries provides
opportunities not only for economic
development, but for development of
solid environmental protection programs
at the same time. Thus, while
environmental politics on the international
level remain very important, this fact
does not relieve the individual states from
taking effective measures at the national
level before any conventions can be
agreed on.
BASIC STRUCTURES OF
NATIONAL PROGRAMS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Constitutional Law
A number of countries have
strengthened the position of
environmental protection by introducing
constitutional guarantees for the
protection of the natural foundations of
life.' The Portuguese Constitution, for
example, guarantees everybody "the right
to a healthy and ecologically balanced
human environment."8  In both the
Spanish and Portuguese Constitutions the
duty to preserve the environment
corresponds to this fundamental right.7
On the basis of such a constitutional
guarantee, environmental concerns
should normally be considered in the
decision-making processes of the
governmental institutions. However, the
example of the socialist countries shows
that declarations alone do not promote
environmental protection. We must
examine the various legal sectors to
determine how countries approach their
environmental problems.'
B. Environmental Protection: A Domain
of Administrative Law
Legislators worldwide have addressed
environmental exploitation through a
more or less comprehensive network of
administrative regulations. In order to
shed light on this overwhelming field, it is
useful to describe the formal systems,
the principles of substantive law, and the
decision-making processes.
1. Formal Systems
Federal legislators have introduced a
central environmental code in many
countries. Japan was the first (1967),
followed by Sweden (1969), Denmark
(1973), Norway (1981), Switzerland
(1985), Greece (1986) and Great Britain
(1991). The purpose of these codes is to
insure that in administrative decisions the
different environmental media, such as
water, air and soil, would not be regarded
independently; instead, the decision-
making processes would integrate the
different media and consider their
interrelationship. The Swiss Code
establishes additional important principles
and procedures, such as the polluter-pays
principle and binding administrative
orders for legal implementation.' 0
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In contrast to such integrated laws,
other countries, such as Belgium and
Italy, promulgated laws that regulate
isolated environmental media (e.g., water
protection) or react to certain abuses.
Until April 1991, the British
environmental law seemed to be
incomplete and unstructured.11  The
implementation of laws compensates for
the deficits caused by such disjointed
legal regimes.
2. Principles of Substantive Law
The "classical" principles, such as the
polluter-pays principle or the common
burden principle (in which all of society
shares the costs for repairing ecological
damage), are quite well known. Very
often, however, these principles are
reduced to mere platforms, distorted or
even abandoned in the implementation of
the environmental laws. Therefore,
permissible emission levels are better
indicators of environmental policies and,
in particular, of which environmental
hazards the policies prioritize.
To strengthen the implementation
phase there are a great variety of legal
solutions. On the one hand, there are
standards like "best practicable
means," 12 which start out from a rather
pragmatic and economically oriented
view. Applying this standard,
environmental protection by legal means
is designed only to "prevent unacceptable
burdens and create a climate in which
business can flourish."' 3  Other
countries, on the other hand, set higher
standards. In Switzerland, for instance,
the laws require the administration to
consider particularly sensitive groups of
the population, such as "children, sick
persons, aged people and pregnant
women," 14 when establishing permissible
emission levels. In addition, Swiss
standards for soil pollution are oriented
according to the actual load capacity of
specific soil types."
In this context the provisions in US
environmental law become important.
US environmental laws provide a scale of
different standards from "best
conventional pollution control
technology" to "best practicable
technology" to "best available technology
economically achievable." This scale
could function as a model for other
countries."8 However, there are many
practical problems associated with such
standards. Much depends on whether,
and to what extent, administrative
agencies have the power to make
discretionary decisions in individual
cases.
3. Decision-Making Processes
In an effort to develop uniform
standards, manfy countries have
introduced binding emissions standards
for pollutants. 7  These are usually
determined by authorized institutions
(such as federal environmental agencies)
after hearing testimony from different
social interest groups. These agencies
are then often absolutely bound to uphold
the regulations they promulgate. In this
way they can limit ecological risks, and,
ideally, with adequate participation of the
persons and entities potentially affected
by the standards, establish a broad
consensus.
One must also note that in the process
of determining such standards,
policymakers are weighing economic and
technical considerations, as well as
regional considerations. Therefore, there
is a danger that, under pressure from
these different sectors, lawmakers will
set the standards too low from the
beginning. This may explain the
phenomenon in Japan, which established
standards during the sixties, where
enterprises and government
administrations are entering into "local
environmental agreements" on a
voluntary basis. The agreements usually
contain marginal values that are far
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stricter than the ones set up nationally.
In contrast to these techniques of
developing uniform standards, other
countries support a concept of strict
decentralization of environmental policy.
They give environmental administrative
agencies broad discretionary powers to
decide when, where and how to
intervene.19  Therefore, pragmatic
solutions can be achieved and
environmental improvements can be
introduced step by step. However, we
have to raise the question whether the
individual agencies possess sufficient
legitimacy to bear the responsibility for
the enormous risks with which they are
dealing. There is also the apprehension
that cooperation between companies and
regulatory agencies might result in
"agency capture" and thereby
compromise environmental policies."9
Administrative law no doubt plays the
biggest role in developing an
environmental policy oriented toward the
prevention of damage. We still must ask
the question how the legal order can
enforce environmentally considerate
behavior by means of criminal law.
Before I try to give an answer by legal
comparison, I must address another task
of the legal system: the compensation
for damages.
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES
(TORT LAW)
In contrast to the internationally
recognized polluter-pays principle, in
many places the victims or the public
provides compensation for environmental
damages. Traditional legal instruments
hold no one liable if the destruction was
caused by the accumulation of many
different emissions from many different
sources. Destruction caused by acid
deposition is one example. For this
reason, Japan introduced "no-fault"
liability for certain environmental
damages in reaction to the "Big Four
Pollutions." Entities may offer statistical
proof, but exculpation is possible only if
there is evidence that the emitter has
used the best methods available
worldwide. Actions for damages may
even be successful in cases where the
polluter acted according to an
administrative permit, but only if the
pollution exceeds the socially accepted
level.2" This form of strict liability is
expected to deter much environmentally
unsound behavior.
European governments took legislative
action to address problems of liability
much later than Japan. Germany, for
example, did not introduce absolute
liability until January 1, 1991 21 These
no-fault claims, however, are limited to
damages for which an individual actor
can be held responsible. Such claims are
not possible in many cases due to the
cumulative effects of emissions.
In an effort to correct the perceived
inequities of such a system, many
countries are creating compensation
funds, which are financed by
contributions of polluters according to
their emissions. In Japan, for example,
the money is being used to compensate
damages to human health caused by air
or water pollution.21 In these cases no
evidence of any individual causation is
necessary.
Furthermore, taxes scaled according to
the environmental risk of the pollution
may also work as incentives for reducing
ecological dangers. There is considerable
resistance against such solutions,
however, because of the potentially high
costs associated with such a regulatory
structure. The difficulties of putting such
controlling mechanisms into effect may
be one reason for the increasing
emphasis on international criminal law.
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POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF
CRIMINAL LAW: PREVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE,
ENHANCING ENVIRONMENTAL
AWARENESS, AND
SUPPORTING ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
A. Reforms
The world has seen a new boom in
criminal law during the last twenty years.
The trend toward criminalization was
triggered by the worldwide discovery of
environmental calamities that triggered
the public's interest. The wave of reform
in Europe began in Sweden and the
Netherlands in 1969 and took hold in
most other countries in the seventies and
eighties. Table 1 illustrates this
development. Some countries have
incorporated environmental offenses into
their penal codes or have established
basic eco-offenses. Other countries have
created regulatory offenses exclusively in
administrative environmental legislation.
It is noteworthy that in many countries
further reforms have been carried out
(especially in Sweden and Austria) or are
being prepared (especially in Germany,
Finland, Belgium, Switzerland and
Brazil). 3 All of these reforms aim to
expand and strengthen environmental
protection; they are motivated by the
poor results of the practical
implementation of the previous
regulations. In fact, criminal law was,
and is still, very limited in its application,
particularly as applied to the more serious
types of pollution. As a rule, in many
countries only minor sanctions are being
imposed. 24
Indeed, environmental protection by
means of criminal law poses a number of
basic problems, a few of which I will
outline below.
1. The Relationship Between Criminal
Law and Administrative Law
As I have demonstrated,
administrative law plays a dominant role
in the protection of the environment. It
has made fundamental determinations as
to the extent of permissible pollution and
acceptable risks in broad areas,
frequently leaving to the administrative
agencies the task of establishing the
allowable level of pollution in individual
cases. In order to ascertain the scope of
criminal liability, penal law has generally
deferred to the definitions of socially
acceptable behavior found in the
administrative law.
Basic unresolved problems arise from
the existence of these mala
administratione prohibita, no matter
which type of legal system is involved.
Thus, where penal and administrative law
are closely interconnected, as in the
Anglo-American states (and those legally
influenced by them), there is danger of
"inflation" of criminal law and thus of an
impairment of its value. The credibility of
penal law is affected not only by the
highly selective prosecution by
environmental administrative agencies,
but also by relatively low penal
sanctions. 26  Where criminal law and
administrative law are strictly separated
in both organization and structure (as, for
example, in many European continental
states), it has been said that one can
even observe conditions resembling "civil
war" between prosecutorial and
administrative agencies In their
aspirations for primacy in environmental
protection.28
Three models represent the possible
relationships between criminal law and
administrative law (Table 2). Model one
is the classical (subsidiary) criminal law
that is absolutely subordinate to
administrative law. In the second model
we find a recent trend toward criminal
statutes which are only relatively
11/'
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dependent on administrative law. In the
third model, criminal norms are absolutely
independent of administrative processes
in special cases. Some countries have
chosen criminal programs that
incorporate all of these systems.
a. Independent Criminal Law
Criminal laws that are absolutely
independent of administrative law and
administrative decisions (Model 1)
generally cover those cases where there
is evidence that environmental damage
leads to "concrete endangerment" of life
and limb.2 ' Presumably, the particularly
serious types of behavior penalized are
variants of public safety offenses for
which administrative consent would be
unavailable anyway. Nevertheless,
proving causal links between acts of
pollution and concrete endangerment is
still extremely difficult.2 8 To overcome
this problem, Japanese legislators have
introduced a legally binding presumption
of causation, according to which a
substance is presumed to have caused a
danger if substances of the same type
would normally cause that danger if
released in a hazardous manner.29
b. Criminal Offenses Which Are
Relatively Dependent on
Administrative Law
Other countries have attempted to
avoid such drastic inroads into the
traditional domain of criminal law by
reducing the thresholds of liability.
Model 1 requires a concrete
endangerment to life and limb for penal
liability. In Model 2 this threshold is
reduced: instead of a concrete
endangerment, an abstract risk to human
health or risk to environmental media is
sufficient for penal liability. This
prerequisite can be proved more easily
than concrete endangerments.
The next distinction is that in Model 1,
behavior cannot be legalized by an
administrative permit because the agency
has no right to allow concrete
endangerments of persons. By contrast,
in Model 2 one enters the field of the
administrative agencies: they determine
the socially acceptable risks of
endangerment. Concrete endangerment
limits their discretion, but they do have
the power to allow abstract risks.
Bringing the regulated behavior under the
direction of the administrative agencies
has the disadvantage of making
environmental protection dependent on
the forms of administrative law. In
effect, if pollution is legal with an agency
permit, the court has no authority to
impose criminal sanctions.
As a consequence of this dependence,
actors (administrative agencies, industrial
companies, and social organizations) and
non-criminal administrative entities are
engaged in defining the criminal
wrong.30  For example, Sweden has
criminalized any pollution of water, air or
land constituting an abstract risk to
human health3 1 These countries have
facilitated an expansion of criminal
responsibility not even reached by the
Swedish risk offenses, which require that
the pollution of the environmental media
pose at least an abstract risk to human
health. These regimes forbid any
pollution in the absence of an
administrative permit. Therefore,
expansion of penal liability relies on the
interpretation of environmental media:
when is water or land polluted
sufficiently to warrant criminal liability?
Two points may illustrate the relative
dependence on administrative law: first,
mere disobedience of administrative
orders is not criminal, and second, the
government imposes criminal sanctions
only where acts have led to actual
damaging effects to the environment. A
permit legalizes acts,32 but this does not
mean that a permit grants absolute rights
upon the polluter. For example, in some
cases emissions may cause damage to
human health despite the emitter's
compliance with all of the emission
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standards established by the authorities.
The emitter may also possess an
outdated permit that does not correspond
with current ecological requirements.33
In both of these cases the question arises
whether the administrative authorities
would have to revoke the license before
further measures could be taken against
the polluter.34 There is a tendency to
refuse a criminal defense based on
possession of a permit in these cases,
and, as a result, the license holder is
subject to criminal liability; 6 in
Germany, the authorities base liability on
the concept of an abusive exercise of a
right.3 8
c. Criminal Offenses Which Are
Absolutely Dependent on
Administrative Law
These issues do not arise with
criminal offenses that are absolutely
dependent on administrative provisions
(Model 3). The principal aim is to
guarantee the enforcement of
administrative regulations and the
cooperation of industries with the
administrative agencies. This is
especially the case in countries such as
Great Britain and Canada, where
administrative enforcement mechanisms
are virtually nonexistent and the threat of
invoking criminal sanctions remains the
only means of governmental coercion.3"
The subordinate function of criminal law
is particularly evident where the violation
of an administrative regulation itself does
not lead to criminal liability, but merely
allows the administration either to issue
a warning and set a date for compliance
(Italy) or to serve an "abatement notice"
(United Kingdom)." Under this regime
only a repeated or continuing violation is
subject to criminal prosecution - and,
moreover, actual prosecution often lies
within the discretion of an administrative
agency."
The role and function of criminal law is
quite different in the various countries.
Regardless of the several concepts,
however, there is a general tendency
toward facilitating criminal liability.
2. Facilitating the Attribution of
Criminal Liability
Frequently, ecological damage can
only be ascertained statistically, as it is
often caused by the cumulative effects of
diverse emissions. As a result, many
national criminal law regimes attempt to
protect the environment not only from
actual damage, but from potential
damage as well. This is quite common In
the regulation of specific hazardous
industrial activities.' For example,
Switzerland has extended criminal liability
in the area of water use, subjecting
everyone to the risk of criminal
prosecution." The Swiss Federal Court
has approved the policy of prosecuting
"pollution as a mass phenomenon in
every single case."'
This system of mass liability is
problematic because (1) with limited
resources, it is impossible to prosecute a
mass phenomenon in every single case,
and (2) criminal law functions only if it
has to regulate the "hypersensitive,"
isolated conduct of outsiders, not if it
must monitor the conduct of the masses.
If legislators make it easier to prove
individual liability, then the issue of
limited resources and prosecutorial
discretion arises. Who will they target
for enforcement when resources prevent
them from prosecuting each individual?
This is a special problem when criminal
laws in the field of environmental
protection are addressed to everybody,
industries and private persons alike. In
the US one does not have these problems
because environmental criminal law Is
focused on industrial behavior.
Another important issue is one of
notice: to what extent must the target of
a criminal provision have notice of the
implementing administrative regulation?
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The answer to this question is by no
means self-evident. The relevant
administrative rules may fill a whole
bookcase or may not be easily
accessible. Statutes and the courts often
do not require actual notice of the
relevant provisions to impose criminal
liability. This may pose serious questions
of fairness in countries such as Great
Britain, where many administrative laws
create strict liability offenses."
In countries where criminal law is
based on principles of individual
responsibility and a concept of ethical
guilt, the legal regimes require strict proof
of personal fault. These countries do
allow some presumptions of notice,
however. For example, Austria recently
passed legislation establishing liability for
environmental endangerment, even
though the defendant was not aware of
the relevant administrative provision,
provided that he or she should have had
knowledge thereof. 44  In other
countries, such as Germany, Switzerland
and the US, courts have taken the
initiative and will presume the
defendant's increased awareness of
statutory duties, depending on the class
and profession of the defendant.4
Therefore, the courts may expect that
operators of dangerous plants have
notice of the relevant regulations.
In practice, environmental
administrative agencies have developed
their own criteria for determining whether
an offender merits punishment. As a
rule, they tend to pursue a policy of
cooperation and persuasion rather than
confrontation. Prosecution is limited to
those cases where the agency suspects
intentional violations.4" In countries
where the administrative agencies have
indirect influence on prosecution
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland and
others), 47  only the persistent
perpetrators are handed over to the
prosecutorial agencies.
3. From Individual Responsibility to
Collective Liability
We have seen that worldwide there
is a tendency to attribute responsibility
on an impersonal basis. Researchers
with a traditional orientation recognize
with astonishment or fear that this
tendency is dissolving basic principles of
criminal law. This may be so, but it is
necessary because the conventional
principles of individual fault are becoming
counter-productive in the context of
mass contaminations, where individual
causation is difficult to prove. Because
of this fact, some legislators are of the
opinion that criminal liability based only
on the determination of personal fault is
not sufficient to protect the environment
from the enormous pollution caused by
big enterprises.
There is evidence of an international
trend to make criminal law more
prominent, especially where the
enterprise itself has traditionally been
subject to criminal liability." Even in
states that have traditionally adhered to
the principle of societas delinquere non
potest ("enterprises cannot be criminal')
there is a growing tendency toward
imposing criminal liability on enterprises.
Commissions of experts are examining
such proposals in Belgium and
Switzerland and have written drafts in
Finland and France.
Other countries adhere formally to the
principle that an enterprise cannot be
criminal, but they have looked for ways
to impose non-criminal sanctions on
those enterprises. Austria, for example,
introduced a peculiar form of sanction in
1988: an enterprise may be fined if it has
obtained benefits from the commission of
a crime. Austria's courts will disgorge
extra profits upon a finding of the
managing director's grossly negligent
acts. In contrast, Sweden imposes an
environmental protection fee levied on
the basis of strict liability and the
violation of emissions standards." This
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leads us to an examination of the
requirements of enterprise liability.
Traditionally, the basis for corporate
liability has been a criminal act by some
organ of the enterprise that was then
attributed to the corporation as a whole.
This basis for liability is especially
common in Great Britain and Canada." °
More recent statutory regulations have
moved away from this respondeat
superior theory, and instead require the
breach of a duty resulting from some
organizational defect in the company
followed by the occurrence of certain
effects (e.g., "serious damage" in
Sweden). 61  The violation of an
obligation to supervise is frequently
regarded as such a defect.
6 2
The crucial question regarding the
phenomenon of "organized personal
irresponsibility" is whether corporate
liability requires a finding of individual
fault at all. The trend in the international
community is not to require a finding of
individual culpability, especially if the
organization's defect itself bars criminal
liability. For example, the Swedish law
mentioned above does not require such a
management defect, but merely requires
a finding that the company violated
specific administrative duties and that
those violations benefitted the company.
It remains an open question if, and to
what extent, such models of sanctioning,
which go much further than civil law
liability, are still compatible with basic
theories of criminal law.
CONCLUSIONS
Our tour d'horizon of the international
platform and the national programs of
environmental law have addressed some
crucial points. These issues, in one
respect or another, affect important
principles of the different legal systems,
principles that guarantee a functioning
legal system. The existing ecological
threats suggest that we abandon some
basic legal principles in favor of more
effective environmental protection; many
countries have either done so, or are In
the process of transition.
Given this trend, the basic question
becomes what price are we willing to pay
for better ecological safeguards? In
answering this question we should note
that the classical principles of criminal
liability become counterproductive when
we take into consideration the practical
limitations of environmental criminal
law: 3  a large number of the
prosecutions are for petty cases, high
dismissal rates are typical, and sanctions
are low, sometimes comparable to those
imposed for shoplifting.
On the other hand, It should be
emphasized that criminal law does not
constitute a universal remedy for
straightening out legal systems in
disarray. Sometimes it seems that
legislators have made tremendous
progress, but they have not taken
measures that are effective and well
structured. Efficiency may result from
their efforts, but efficiency should be
more than the short-sighted effect of a
statutory measure that the legislature
enacts in reaction to some spectacular
incident.
There is no doubt that further research
is imperative in order to judge which roles
and functions criminal law should fulfill
with respect to environmental protection
and which it can fulfill without accepting
a serious erosion of its concepts. There
is, for example, the danger of inflating
the criminal law: in the regulatory regime
in which criminal sanctions are absolutely
subordinate to administrative law, the
label of "criminal" can become quite
diffuse, diluting its moral impact. Public
perception of what is truly blameworthy
criminal conduct can diminish when both
murder and mere disobedience of
administrative orders are defined as
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criminal.
Additionally, it is difficult to define
with certainty and clarity those forms of
unlawful environmental pollution that are
worthy of being criminalized. One
solution is to incorporate serious
violations in the penal code and to
establish a collateral system on the basis
of a more objective, non-personal liability
tailored to the specific technical problems
of modern society.
A complete and integrated analysis
should not only address these principal
problems and the possibilities for
adequate implementation, but must also
take into consideration the consequences
for the overall structure of the legal
instruments, as well as their credibility.
Hopefully, legislators will realize that
effective environmental protection also
requires economic incentives,
accompanied by precise regulations in all
of the different legal sectors. The two
crucial barriers are the deficient
implementation of existing laws (for
example, soft implementation and
economic interests) and the lack of
consistent ecological policies set forth in
coherent legal regimes. If cohesive and
uniform ecological policies and strategies
are established, criminal law will provide
a powerful structure for reducing
environmental crimes.
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TABLE 1: REFORM STAGES IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION BY MEANS OF CRIMINAL LAW*
1.1 Penal sanctions situated in the penal code or in basic eco-offenses
Country Years of Reform Location
penal code basic
eco-regulation
India 1960/1986 +/- -/+
Sweden (S) 1969/1981/1989 -I+1+ +1+1+
Netherlands (NL) 1969/1989 +/+ -I-
Japan 1970 +
USSR 1970/1974/198011982 +/+1+1+ -I-I--
Poland (Pol) 1970/1980 +1- -/+
Denmark (DK) 1973/1987 -I- +1+
Austria (A) 1976/1989 +1+ -I-
Yugoslavia (Yu) 1977 +
East Germany (GDR) 1977/1989 +/+ -I-
South Korea 1977 +
China 1979 +
West Germany (FRG) 1980 +
Cdlombia 1981 +
Norway 1981 +
Portugal (P) 1983 +
Spain (Sp) 1983 + -
Turkey 1983 + +
Switzerland (CH) 1985 +
Greece 1986 +
Cuba 1987 +
Czechoslovakia 1989 +
Selected reforms
+ Indicates penal sanctions added in reform year.
- Indicates no penal sanctions added in reform year.
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1.2 Penal Sanctions Exclusively in Administrative Laws
Country Years of Reform
France (F) 1964/1976/1984
Belgium (B) 1964/1971/1979
Italy 1966/1976/1982/1988
United Kingdom (GB) 1968/1974/1975/1991
USA 1970-1978/1987
Canada (CDN) 1970-1976
TABLE 2: INTERNATIONAL MODELS FORTHE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CRIMINAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE FIELD OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Model 1
Criminal law absolutely independent of
administrative provisions
0 injury to the environment and public danger/
concrete danger to life and limb
(FRG, DK, NL, P, Pol)
Model 2
Criminal law relatively subordinate
to administrative provisions/
decision-making
" injury to the environment and
abstract risk of danger to human
health, without permit (S, Sp)
* pollution of the water, without
permit (FRG, CH)
" lasting pollution, infraction of a
legal administrative obligation
(A, Sp, Yu)
Model 3
Criminal law absolutely
dependent on administrative
provisions/decision making
* breach of an administrative
provision (B, CDN, F, UK)
* discharge/emission without
license or consent (GB, USA)
" contravention of the obligation
to inform the administrative
agency (F, B)
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